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COMMENTS
VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: SEVERANCE PAY
Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1973)
Plaintiff was employed by defendant over a five-year period, during
which he spent four and one-half years on the job and an intervening
six months in military service.' Plaintiff thereafter voluntarily left the
company. Although defendant's employees who accumulated five or
more years of service credits qualified for severance pay, plaintiff was
denied severance pay because he had not received one-half year's ser-
vice credits for his military time.2 Plaintiff sued to collect severance
pay, charging a violation of his right as a veteran to be restored to em-
ployment with no loss of seniority under sections 459(b)(B) and (c)
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.3 The federal district
1. Plaintiff worked from June 4, 1962, until September 21, 1962. He satisfactorily
completed military service on March 11, 1963. Restored to his position on March 23,
1963, he worked until June 22, 1967. Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 69 CCH
Lab. Cas. 25,492, 25,493 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. A collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff's union and defendant pro-
vided that defendant contribute 20 cents to the union's retirement fund for each hour
worked by covered employees, up to 40 hours per week. The agreement made no pro-
vision for severance pay; rather, this benefit was provided in accordance with fund rules.
Severance pay was distributed from the fund to employees terminating employment after
accumulating five service credits. An employee received one-quarter service credit for
each 400 "hours actually worked," or one credit per year maximum. The fund trustees
apparently based service credit determinations on the number of hours for which defend-
ant contributed to the fund. Id. at 25,493-94. Although the appellate court stated that
plaintiff was denied severance pay because defendant refused to include his military time
in its calculation of service credits, see Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d
586, 587 (2d Cir. 1973), more accurately severance pay was denied because defendant
refused to contribute to the fund during plaintiff's military absence.
3. Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 9, 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (1970), for-
merly Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 8, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890
[hereinafter cited as Act], provides in relevant part:
(b) Reemployment rights.
In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and
service, has left or leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the
employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, and (2) makes
application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such
training and service or from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a pe-
riod of not more than one year-
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court granted summary judgment for plaintiff.4 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed and held: Employees are entitled to inclu-
sion of military time for purposes of service credit computation because
severance pay that accrues with length of service is a prerogative of
seniority and is therefore protected by the Act.'
Reemployment provisions of the Act6 provide that a veteran who
(B) If such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person
shall-
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by
such employer or his successor in interest to such position or to a position
of like seniority, status, and pay;
unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossi-
ble or unreasonable to do so;
(c) Service considered as furlough or leave of absence.
(1) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) of this section shall be con-
sidered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of
training and service in the armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of
seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered
by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employ-
ees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time
such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from
such position without cause within one year after such restoration.
The court in Palmarozzo referred to the Act by its former name, Universal Military
Training and Service Act, which had been substituted in 1951 for the still older name,
Selective Service Act of 1948. Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, § l(a), 65 Stat. 75,
amending Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 1(a), 62 Stat. 604.
4. Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 25,492, 25,495
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The district court concluded that, theoretically, defendant should
have contributed to the fund "for such number of hours in the period of [plaintiff's]
military service as would enable him to accumulate the same Service Credits under the
Rules as he would have accumulated had he remained continuously in the em-
ploy of Cola." Id. The court nevertheless gave judgment against defendant for the
entire amount of severance pay as damages. Since the fund's trustees were not parties,
the court had no way to compel them to pay if the judgment merely required Cola to
contribute. This result is justifiable not only as "damages," but also because, under the
fund's rules, any hiatus in employment greater than two years operated to cancel all ac-
crued service credits. Id. at 25,494. More than two years had elapsed between plain-
tiffs departure and the award of judgment.
5. Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 94 S. Ct. 3083 (1974). The opinion of the court of appeals contains no reference
to the form in which the district court's remedy was framed. See note 4 supra. But
see 490 F.2d at 594 n.1 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
6. From the Revolutionary War until World War I, veterans' benefits usually took
the form of land grants. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PEN-
SIONS, VETERANS' BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1956); Comment, Veterans' Re-
employment Rights under Selective Service Interpretations, 54 YALE L.J. 417 (1945).
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leaves civilian employment for military service shall be restored to his
civilian employment in the same position or to one of "like seniority,
status, and pay.' 7 The employer must restore the veteran "without loss
of seniority;"8 and, in accordance with the employer's established rules
and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence, the
veteran is entitled to "insurance or other benefits" as if he had been on
employer-sanctioned leave rather than in military service.0
Although the language of the Act and its legislative history ° make
clear the intention of Congress that the veteran should be restored to
his civilian employment, substantial litigation"l has arisen from Con-
gress' lack-of specificity about the veteran's status once his job has been
restored. 12 The phrase "without loss of seniority" was partly ex-
plained by the Supreme Court when it held, in a rule subsequently
tagged the "escalator principle," that the restored veteran not only re-
tains his premilitary seniority, but also accumulates seniority while in
military service.' 3 Seniority is meaningful, however, only to the extent
7. Act § 459(b) (B) (i), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b) (B) (i) (1970).
8. Id. § 459(c)(1), 50U.S.C. App. § 459 (c)(1) (1970).
9. Id. The Act generally applies equally to enlistees and inductees, with certain
distinctions not here relevant. See id. § 459(g), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(g) (1970).
10. See Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the "Escalator Principle", 51
B.U.L. R.v. 539, 540 (1971); Comment, supra note 6, at 417-20.
11. See note 14 infra.
12. It seems clear that some imprecision is essential in order that the statute be suf-
ficiently flexible to apply to the myriad forms of collective bargaining agreements. But
see Haggard, supra note 10, at 583. Congress did not intend to create a system of sen-
iority, recognizing that seniority operates as a purely contractual function of collective
bargaining and receives both scope and significance from union contracts or from estab-
lished rules and practices of the employer. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 V.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526 (1949). But cf. Blair v. Page Aircraft Maint., Inc., 336
F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. In Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946),
the Court said:
[The veteran] does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he
stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied
had he kept his position continuously during the war.
The escalator principle was first incorporated in the Selective Service Act of 1948 §
9(c) (2), ch. 625, § 9(c) (2), 62 Stat. 615 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(c) (2)
(1970)):
It is declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is restored
to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (b) of this section should be so restored in such manner as to give
him such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had con-
tinued in such employment continuously from the time of his entering the
armed forces until the time of his restoration to such employment.
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that it qualifies an employee to receive benefits or privileges. Since
"seniority" and its perquisite benefits are nowhere defined in the Act,
it has fallen upon the courts to delimit the benefits and privileges to
which the veteran is entitled by virtue of his escalator accumulation of
seniority.
There are wide variations in the use of the seniority concept in col-
lective bargaining agreements and in the benefits which flow from it;
consequently, the courts have been unable to settle on a definiton of
seniority. 4 Instead, for purposes of applying the escalator principle,
14. Some benefits, such as order of layoff and recall and the right to bid on a job
vacancy, are traditional prerogatives of seniority to which the escalator principle clearly
applies. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1948); Fish-
gold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946). Other examples include
right to better job classification, right to better working hours, right of access to exam-
inations, and wage rates within a job classification. See generally UNrrED STATES DEP'T
OF LABOR, LEGAL GUME AND CASE DIGEST, VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RiGHTs (1964);
M. WORTMAN & G. WITrERFELD, LABoR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAININo
(1969); Haggard, supra note 10; Note, Veterans' Re-employment Rights Under the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act-Seniority Provisions, 1 GA. L. REv. 293
(1967); Comment, supra note 6. The question whether the escalator principle applies
to other benefits, such as a right to promotion or paid vacation, has been answered dif-
ferently in different cases. For examples of cases considering various benefits, see:
Promotion: Brooks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 182 (1964) (yes); Tilton v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964) (yes); McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R, 357 U.S.
265 (1958) (no); Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 348 U.S. 960 (1955) (yes); Wood v.
Southern Pac. Co., 447 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1971) (yes); Wienberg v. United States, 425
F.2d 1244 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (no).
Paid vacation: Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (yes); Kasmeier
v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971) (no); Morton v. Gulf, M.
& O.R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969) (yes); Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d
719 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969) (no); Mentzel v. Diamond, 167
F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1948) (yes); Fees v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 487 (W.D.
Pa. 1971) (no).
Severance pay: Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966) (yes); Seattle
Star, Inc. v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948) (no); Taylor v. Southern Pac.
Co., 308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (yes).
Wage rate: Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957) (yes); Moe v. East-
ern Air Lines, Inc., 246 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1957) (yes); Blair v. Page Aircraft Maint.,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 815 (5th
Cir. 1972) (yes).
Miscellaneous: Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973) (un-
employment benefits) (yes); Harvey v. Braniff Int'l Airways, Inc., 164 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1947) (qualifying exam and promotion) (no); Gentile v. United States Trucking
Corp., 355 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (general welfare benefit) (no); Litwicki v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 84 L.R.R.M. 2538 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (pension) (yes); Bradley v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (absence credits) (no); Simons
v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 262 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Iowa 1966) (seniority per se) (no); Hirehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/4
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the courts have attempted to define seniority functionally by distin-
guishing between benefits which are perquisites of seniority and those
which are not. Thus, according to the judicial doctrine of automatic
right, a seniority benefit is one which accrues automatically to an em-
ployee merely because he is continuously employed. A veteran who
would automatically have qualified for such a benefit but for his time
in military service is entitled to the benefit on his return because of
the escalator principle.15
In practice, this doctrine was given increasingly liberal interpreta-
tion,'0 and employers frequently rejoined in court by relying on other
v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 211 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 324 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963) (layoff benefit) (yes).
15. Although applied in cases of all kinds, the automatic-right doctrine developed
primarily from a line of promotion benefit decisions. See, e.g., Altgens v. Associated
Press, 188 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1951); Nevins v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 172 F.2d 535 (6th
Cir. 1949); Polansky v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 78 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1948). See
also Wood v. Southern Pac. Co., 447 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1971); Wienberg v. United
States, 425 F.2d 1244 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Hattan v. Tabard Press Corp., 406 F.2d 593 (2d
Cir. 1969); Power v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 388 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1968). Haggard,
supra note 10, at 549, concludes:
In this context the escalator principle soon came to stand for the proposition
that upon the veteran's return from the military he is immediately entitled to
the promotion he would have received if he had not been in the military if
that promotion were solely a prerogative of seniority.
A typical statement of the rule may be found in Hollman v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft,
435 F.2d 983, 989 (5th Cir. 1970) (vacation pay), as follows:
Mhe veteran's stake in [seniority benefits] must be protected if they would
automatically accrue to him but for induction.
See also Comment, Seniority Rights of Reemployed Veterans, 1969 LAw & Soc. 0. 445;
Note, supra note 14.
But if qualification for the particular benefit depends on something more than con-
tinuous employment, e.g., increased proficiency, experience, managerial discretion, the
benefit is not automatic and not a perquisite of seniority, nor is the returning veteran
entitled to the benefit any more than an employee who had been on leave of absence.
See, e.g., McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958); Addison v. Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R., 204 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1953); Altgens v. Associated Press, 188 F.2d
727 (5th Cir. 1951); Rose v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 171 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1948); Rauling
v. Memphis Union Sta. Co., 168 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1948); Spearmon v. Thompson, 167
F.2d 626 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 822 (1948). A Fifth Circuit formulation
is typical:
Where an employee has no fixed or absolute right to promotion and where his
right to promotion depends upon qualifications over and above mere length
of service, the employer has fully complied with the terms of the [Act] when
he restores the veteran to the same position . . . which he held at the time
of his induction into the service.
Harvey v. Braniff Int'l Airways, Inc., 164 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1947).
16. Particularly as applied to promotion benefits, the automatic-right doctrine was
given increasingly broad interpretation. This trend began essentially with the SupremeWashington University Open Scholarship
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language in the Act. Since the veteran was entitled to "insurance or
other benefits" only if he would have been entitled to them under the
collective bargaining agreement had he been on leave of absence rather
than in the military,' 7 it was argued that these "other benefits" were not
affected by the escalator principle. Judicial response to this reasoning
often was resolution of questions of employer liability by mechanical
classification of particular claimed fringe benefits into two categories:
"seniority benefit," entitling the veteran to credit for military time, or
"other benefit," not so entitling him.18 Under this second "functional"
Court's decision in Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 348 U.S. 960, rev'g per curiam 211 F.2d
95 (3d Cir. 1954). See also Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278 (1949); Note,
Veterans' Reemployment Rights Re-examined, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 375, 385 (1971). By
1964 the "rule" had become a flexible standard permitting a veteran to qualify for a
benefit for which it was reasonably certain he would have qualified but for military ser-
vice. In that year the Supreme Court, in Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169,
180 (1964), said:
Properly read ... McKinney [see note 15 supra] holds that where advancement
depends on an employer's discretionary choice not exercised prior to entry into
service, a returning veteran cannot show within the reasonable certainty re-
quired by the Act that he would have enjoyed advancement simply by virtue
of continuing employment during the time he was in military service.
Thus in a case in which employer's discretionary review was limited to promotion or
discharge for obvious incompetence-promotion and pay increases otherwise being based
on "experience"--the court concluded that it was reasonably certain that plaintiff's ad-
vanoement would have occurred and he was therefore entitled to his benefits under the
Act. Hatton v. Tabard Press Corp., 406 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Brooks
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 182 (1964) (plaintiff's benefits under Act should not
be adversely affected by possibility that forces of supply and demand would have pre-
vented his automatic promotion); Montgomery v. Southern Elec. Steel Co., 410 F.2d 611
(5th Cir. 1969); Collins v. Weirton Steel Co., 398 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1968); Power
v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 388 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1968); In re Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 624 (1966) (Herbert, Arbitrator); Haggard, supra note 10,
at 559-67.
17. Act § 459(c)(1), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (c)(1) (1970).
18. In early cases all fringe benefits were held to fall distinctly into one or the other
of these two categories. See, e.g., Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957);
Alvado v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
983 (1956); Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948).
In Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1948), the court
said:
Since vacation rights are not pay unless they are for work actually done, and
since they are not merely a perquisite of seniority, they must fall under the
heading of "other benefits."
Thus, under the language of the Act, plaintiff had to be treated as having been on fur-
lough or leave of absence. In Dwyer v. Crosby Co., supra at 570, Judge Learned Hand
said:
[O]bviously the considerations which might make it proper that service in the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/4
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approach, the courts tended to construe "seniority benefits" narrowly
and "other benefits" broadly,19 until this practice was curtailed when
the Supreme Court shifted the analytical emphasis in Accardi v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad.20
In Accardi the Supreme Court reiterated and seemingly confirmed
the automatic-right doctrine.21 "Seniority" should be given a liberal
construction,2" the Court said, and the "other benefits" clause was in-
tended to increase the veteran's protection rather than diminish it.23
Army should not affect a man's seniority are utterly different from those which
should count in computing vacations.
A further example of the conclusion usually reached under this approach may be found
in Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318, 320-21 (9th Cir.), rev'd per curtam, 389
U.S. 323 (1967).
A consideration threading all the cases is the uneasy distinction between fringe bene-
fits and pay in the sense of a wage rate directly linked to work performed. Resulting
confusion can be seen in the quotation from Siaskiewicz, where the court seems to be
suggesting three categories, compensation or pay, seniority benefits, and other benefits.
See, e.g., Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957) (court spoke explic-
itly of three categories; "insurance and other benefits" construed to "cover a fairly nar-
row group of economic advantages" whose common quality is that they are miscellane-
ous fringe benefits not usually regarded as part of pay, status, or seniority). It is true
in a sense that three categories exist, but it is not a very subtle distinction for it is clear
that Congress never intended that the veteran receive hourly work compensation, for ex-
ample, during his military tour of duty. See text accompanying notes 23-24 infra (dis-
cussion of work requirements); note 26 infra (same).
19. See, e.g., cases cited note 18 supra; Haggard, supra note 10, at 569.
20. 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
21. Id. at 229-30:
[The intention of the 1940 Act] was to preserve for the returning veterans the
rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued to them had they
remained in private employment rather than responding to the call of their
country.
22. Id. at 229:
[That] "seniority" is nowhere defined in the Act . . . does not mean . . . that
employers and unions are empowered by the use of transparent labels and defi-
nitions to deprive a veteran of substantial rights guaranteed by the Act. ....
The term "seniority" is not to be limited by a narrow, technical definition but
must be given a meaning that is consonant with the intention of Congress as
expressed in the 1940 Act.
See O'Haver, Vacation Rights for Returning Veterans: Should Work Requirements Be
Waived?, 24 LAB. L.J. 259, 262 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L.
Rlv. 123, 142 (1966); Note, supra note 16, at 385.
23. 383 U.S. at 232:
[The "other benefits" language in § 459(c)] was intended to add certain pro-
tections to the veteran and not to take away those which are granted him by
[§ 459(b) (B)] and the other clauses of [§ 459(c)].
But cf. Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).Washington University Open Scholarship
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But more importantly, the Court emphasized analysis of the "real na-
ture" of the benefit. The employer had argued that qualification for
severance pay was conditioned on actual work performed and that this
work requirement made the benefit's genuine character that of deferred
compensation, and not a seniority prerogative. The Court disagreed.
The severance payments in issue were "based primarily on the em-
ployees' length of service" and the purported work requirement was
merely a sham to camouflage the automatic character of the benefit.24
The "real nature" of severance payments that were "based primarily
on . . . length of service" was compensation, not for work done in
the past, but rather for rights and benefits forfeited by giving up a job.
Because these rights and benefits, which increase in proportion to sen-
iority, were protected by the Act, severance pay that was compensation
for their loss also must be protected; otherwise, veterans would be given
"'seniority in some general abstract sense," but would be denied the
"perquisites and benefits that flow from it."25 Accardi has settled very
little. Since the Court held that a sham work requirement could not be
used to cover up automatic accrual of a seniority benefit, many lower
courts have inferred by negative implication that a true work require-
ment-the legitimacy of which must be determined on a case-by-case
basis-would operate to transfer a benefit out of the class of seniority
benefits.26
24. According to the collective bargaining agreement, severance pay was computed
based on the number of years of "compensated service" with the company. A "year"
was defined as at least seven months in each of which the employee had worked at least
one day. 383 U.S. at 227-28, 230. Though nominally a work requirement, it was theo-
retically possible to qualify by working only seven days during the year. Calling this
a "bizarre result," the Court concluded that the work requirement was fictional and held
that the severance allowance was a seniority perquisite protected by the Act. Id. at
230-31.
25. Id. at 230-31.
26. That is when the benefit actually represents compensation for work done pur-
suant to a contractual requirement, it is no longer a perquisite of seniority. Thus, in
Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586, 590 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973), the court
said:
Accardi demands that courts look through "false labels".., and determine if
the benefits primarily relate to length of service.
See, e.g., Locaynia v. American Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 982 (1972); Kasmeier v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir.
1971) (work requirement is not mere facade but legitimate, uniformly applied condition
precedent to vacation benefits when contract required that employee have rendered 110
days compensated service in previous year to qualify for vacation benefit); Tuttle v. U.S.
Plywood Corp., 293 F. Supp. 401, 403 (D. Ore. 1968) ("In this case, unlike Accardi,
the collective bargaining agreements contain bona fide work conditions"); Bradley v.
Vol. 1974:296] 303
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In Palmarozzo, defendant argued that Accardi required the court to
investigate the bona fides of the purported work requirement.2" The
General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (paid vacation benefit goes
to those who have earned it by working specified number of pay periods during eligibil-
ity year). See also O'Haver, supra note 22, at 265 (footnote omitted):
The Labor Department reports that Locaynia is being interpreted to mean that
a veteran is entitled to a full vacation, even in the year of his return, unless
there is a direct relationship. . . between the amount of time worked and the
amount of vacation.
O'Haver argues that, in the paid vacation benefits context, a true work requirement prop-
erly takes the benefii out of the seniority category because the veteran not only has
failed to earn the benefit, but also has received paid vacation while in military service.
Id. at 266. The implication is, of course, that if paid vacation is a seniority perquisite,
the veterans will have received two paid vacations for only one labor.
Most courts state, or at least imply, that a purported seniority benefit which fails the
work requirements test must be considered an "other benefit." See, e.g., Eagar v.
Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323, 325 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Kasmeier v. Chi-
cago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971); Young v. Southern Pac. Co., 84
L.R.R.M. 2546 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Fees v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Connett v. Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Tuttle v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968); Bradley v. General
Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968); cf. Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973); Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969). See also Dougherty v. General Motors
Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 956 (1950); Siaskiewicz v.
General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber
Workers Local 512, 191 F. Supp. 911 (D.R.I.), aff'd per curiam, 294 F.2d 957 (1st Cir.
1961); Note, Reemployment Rights: The Veteran and the Vacation Benefit, 53 B.U.L
REv. 480 (1973). Characterization as an "other benefit," however, is tantamount to
denial of the benefit because if the right to a benefit is conditioned upon an actual work
requirement, an employee on furlough would also not meet the condition. (The exception
occurs if the collective bargaining agreement waives the requirement for furloughed em-
ployees.) The courts seem uncertain how to characterize a benefit determined not to
be a seniority perquisite, but continued classification as "other" in order to deny relief
is anomalous after Accardi. See Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra at 593;
text accompanying note 23 supra. But see Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra
at 593 (dissent). The confusion seems to arise from the obligation apparently felt by
many courts to pigeonhole all "benefits" into one or the other of the two fringe benefit
categories. It is submitted that if a purported benefit is (a) conditioned on a true work
requirement (or conversely, by the "old" test, is nonautomatic), and (b) not one of the
"fairly narrow group of economic advantages" to which furloughed employees would be
entitled, see Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957), then clarity
would be promoted simply by recognizing that the benefit is not a fringe benefit at all;
it is merely compensation for increments of work accomplished.
27. See note 2 supra. Defendant alleged that the severance benefit, rather than
flowing automatically from length of continuous service, was proportionate to hours ac-
tually worked and that the requirement was not a sham, but rather produced benefits
in the nature of deferred compensation. Defendant invited the court to distinguish Ac-
cardi on its facts on the ground that the "compensated service" plan there in issue bore
no relation to the amount of time actually worked. Cf. Haggard, supra note 10, at 571:Washington University Open Scholarship
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court of appeals declined. To require such a case-by-case analysis of
the relationship between benefits and hours worked would ultimately
defeat the Act's usefulness because it would give veterans no firm as-
surance of protection by a specific plan in force, would cause confusion
as to the degree of proportionality sufficient to make a plan compen-
satory rather than a seniority benefit, and would give employers and
union bargainers the power to defeat the Act's purpose merely by chang-
ing the manner in which benefits are calculated.2" The court further
declined to limit Accardi to plans for severance pay bearing no, or
only a "bizarre," relation to hours worked; to the contrary, the "bizarre
results" of that case only served to illustrate that, no matter how calcu-
lated, the real nature29 of severance payments that accrue with length
of continuous employment was compensation for lost seniority rights
and not for work done in the pastAs0 Plaintiff's claimed severance
"This is the essence of the Accardi decision: to ignore technical, contractual limitations
where a benefit is, de facto, a prerogative of seniority."
28. 490 F.2d at 591-92. There is no reason to believe that veterans could foresee
whether their rights are based on seniority per se or upon a nominal work requirement
plan, sham or real. Were the power delegated, employers and unions could easily and
broadly redefine any seniority perquisite to base it upon actual hours worked rather than
seniority. See O'Haver, supra note 22, at 266:
Labor unions are frequently not interested in aggressively handling the griev-
ance of a returning veteran, since too often, the veteran is bumping other union
members who have been paying dues for the three or four years that the vet-
eran has been on the active duty.
See also Helton v. Mercury Freight Lines, 444 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1971) (missed pro-
motion case in which veteran's union opposed his reinstatement in a higher-paid posi-
tion). Helton is cited in O'Haver, supra note 22, at 266 n.26.
29. 490 F.2d at 589 (analyzing Accardi):
[ihe "real nature" of severance benefits which accrue with years of service
was not compensation no matter how the benefits were calculated, but rather
was payment for loss of seniority rights acquired over years of employment.
See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 22, at 149:
This emphasis on the "real nature" of the benefit suggests that determinations
of what is included in "seniority" will be based on the degree to which the pur-
pose of the benefit is normally thought to be compensation for length of ser-
vice with the employer, regardless of the standard of measurement used in the
individual case.
30. 490 F.2d at 589-90. See Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 230
(1966):
[fihe cost to an employee of losing his job is not measured by how much work
he did in the past.., but by the rights and benefits he forfeits by giving up
his job. Among employees who worked at the same jobs in the same craft and
class the number and value of the rights and benefits increase in proportion
to the amount of seniority, and it is only natural that those with the most sen-
iority should receive the highest allowances since they were giving up more
rights and benefits than those with less seniority.
Although a work requirement could be justification for denying deferred compensation
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benefit was produced by length of continuous service rather than by
work actually performed,3 1 and his right to be credited with military
time "expresse[d] the real nature of severance pay which is based
essentially on employment for a particular period of time as inherently
a part of seniority. ... 32
Judge Friendly filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that
Accardi and the work requirement doctrine mandated a different re-
sult in this case.33  Contrary to the majority, he would find that a case-
by-case determination of whether or not the benefit is based primarily
on length of service is required by the Act as construed in Accardi.34
In this case, severance payments were "gauged, albeit not with precise
exactitude, by the amount of work done, not by length of service with
the company," and the benefit thus was not a "manifestation of senior-
ity" sufficient to bring it within the Act's protection. 3 The escalator
principle is inapposite "when the employer or union in good faith con-
ditions benefits on performance rather than mere ,tenure. . ... ,1 If
the severance benefit was not a perquisite of seniority, it must have
been an "other benefit," to which the parties agreed plaintiff was not
entitled.37
Judge Friendly's dissent regarding case-by-case analysis focuses at-
tention on what may be an internal inconsistency at a crucial point in
the majority's reasoning. Speaking for the majority, Judge Anderson
for work done in the past, paid vacation or profit-sharing benefits, for example, or for
determining whether certain pension rights are seniority related, the Palmarozzo court
thought severance pay distinguishable. 490 F.2d at 592-93. But see Litwicki v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 84 L.R.R.M. 2538 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (vesting provision of pension plan
deals with seniority perquisite).
31. 490 F.2d at 589. In a footnote, the court explained that even if case-by-case
analysis were applied, defendant's plan "could not be considered a legitimate work re-
quirement." The severance benefit was "based primarily on length of service" since em-
ployees received one credit for each year of continuous service, were denied credit for
overtime or work in excess of 1600 hours per year, and accumulated increases in five
year increments. Id. at 591 n.4.
32. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 594.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 596. Judge Friendly also pointed out the anomaly glossed over by the
majority that the severance payments in this plan were made by the union. Calling the
fund "wholly a union plan," Judge Friendly concluded that defendant should not be re-
quired to make payments into the fund for hours plaintiff did not work, nor should de-
fendant make payments plaintiff claims are due out of the union's own fund. Id. at
594 n.1. See notes 2 & 4 supra. But see text accompanying note 28 supra.
37. 490 F.2d at 593. See note 26 supra.Washington University Open Scholarship
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eschewed case-by-case analysis.3" But in order to bring the case within
the Accardi holding, the court had to give some consideration to the
details of the plan to determine if the severance payments were "based
primarily on. . .length of service."3 9 Although it is unclear whether
the court disregarded or failed to perceive this problem, a clue is con-
tained in a footnote to the opinion. There the court explained that a
"lump sum payment which does not increase in size with length of em-
ployment" is not a seniority perquisite, regardless of its label. 40  Os-
tensibly, the court's reading of Accardi is that a benefit is "based pri-
marily on . . . length of service" merely if it increases with length of
service. The plan in issue thus need only be examined superficially to
determine this fact; "case-by-case" analysis of the specific manner in
which the benefit is calculated, to determine whether, and how strictly,
it is proportional to hours worked, is therefore unnecessary. Whether
this conclusion is consonant with, or goes beyond, Accardi is problem-
atical.
If the Palmarozzo court has read Accardi correctly, the result is
clearly correct, for severance benefits under defendant's plan obviously
increased with length of employment. Although it is equally clear that
the result would have been in plaintiff's favor had the court applied
the kind of review called for by Judge Friendly,4 the result would be
open in a case in which severance pay is more nearly proportional to
exact number of hours worked. The court of appeals may have in-
terpreted Accardi too liberally. Even so, it is not inconsistent with
Accardi to hold that, regardless of the existence of a purported work
requirement, severance pay is a perquisite of seniority whenever it in-
38. 490 F.2d at 591.
39. This perceived inconsistency appears to stem from Supreme Court language in
Accardi. On the one hand, the Court said that seniority perquisites are those which
are "based primarily on . . .length of service." 383 U.S. at 230. On the other hand,
the Court also stated:
[A label] cannot obscure the fact that the real nature of these payments was
compensation for loss of jobs. And the cost to an employee of losing his job
is not measured by how much work he did in the past-no matter how calcu-
lated-but by the rights and benefits he forfeits by giving up his job.
Id. at 230. And the court of appeals construed this to mean that
the "real nature" of severance benefits which accrue with years of service was
not compensation [for work done in the past] no matter how the benefits were
calculated, but rather was payment for loss of seniority rights acquired over
years of employment.
490 F.2d at 589.
40. 490 F.2d at 590 n.3.
41. See note 31 supra.
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creases with length of service.42  Perhaps sensing that the Act is ex-
cessively flexible, 48 the court appears to believe that it is proper to
classify fringe benefits according to their inherent characteristics and
not according to details supplied by the collective bargaining agree-
ment in each individual case. It is submitted that the Second Circuit
has concluded that severance pay in the general case is presumably44
a seniority perquisite protected by the Act.
Given the large number of Viet Nam veterans and the higher in-
cidence of fringe benefits today than at the end of World War 11, the
courts should attempt to bring a greater degree of certainty and final-
ity to characterization of benefits under the Act, if the already large
stock of decided cases is not to be increased substantially in the future.
Although its reasoning is somewhat cryptic, the Second Circuit steps in
the right direction by emphasizing analysis of the "real nature" of par-
ticular benefits. Consonant with the Supreme Court's mandate in Fish-
gold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.4 that the Act be liberally
construed, the result in Palmarozzo is correct and should be followed
by other courts. It is quite possible, nevertheless, that the court's hold-
ing may have limited impact on other fringe benefits disputes, which
occur with greater frequency than those involving severance pay.4
Even if other courts accept severance benefits as inherently a perquisite
of seniority, there are, as both majority and dissenting opinions dem-
onstrate,4 7 ample grounds on which severance pay can be distinguished
from vacation pay, promotion benefits, and so forth. Hopefully, other
courts will take the "real nature" analysis another step and clarify some
of the semantic confusion which now obstructs delineation of veterans'
rights under the Act.
42. Moreover, this approach is in harmony with the spirit of Accardi insofar as it
prevents the method of calculating benefits from affecting the veteran's rights. See 383
U.S. at 229.
43. See note 12 supra.
44. The majority recognizes that all benefits denominated "severance payment" are
not seniority perquisites and that false labels can cut both ways. 490 F.2d at 590 n.3
(dictum). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
45. 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946). See note 13 supra.
46. Severance pay has been infrequently litigated. See Accardi v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966); Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.
1973); Seattle Star, Inc. v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948); Taylor v. Southern
Pac. Co., 308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Hire v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,
211 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 324 F.2d 546 (6th Cir.
1963).
47. 490 F.2d at 592-93, 595-96.Washington University Open Scholarship
